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Recent Developments

Piselli v. 75th St. Medical:
The Limitations Period for Bringing a Medical Malpractice Claim Does Not
Commence Running Against a Minor Until He Reaches the Age of Majority
By: Bryan C. Hughes

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the
limitations period for bringing a
medical malpractice claim does not
commence running against a minor's
claim until he reaches the age of
majority. Piselli v. 75 th St. Med.,
371 Md. 188, 194,808 A.2d 508,
511 (2002). Requiring otherwise,
the court determined, would place
an unreasonable restriction upon the
remedies available to a child and a
child's access to the courts in
violation of Article 19 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id.
at 215,808 A.2d at 523-24.
Christopher Piselli ("Christopher") first complained of pain in
his left hip inAugust 1993. His father
promptly took him to 75 th St.
Medical Center in Ocean City,
Maryland where Dr. Lynn
Yarborough examined him and
determined that Christopher most
likely pulled a hamstring muscle.
Several days later, the injury was
aggravated and Christopher was
taken by ambulance to a hospital
where it was found that Christopher
had a fracture in his hip.
After a period of attempted
rehabilitation, Christopher suffered
a series of complications starting in
the fall of1993. Following surgery,
doctors informed the family that
Christopher had a permanent
disability that would significantly

impair his ability to participate in
certain activities and would require
multiple surgeries.
In July 1998, Christopher's
parents filed a medical malpractice
claim in the U.S. District Court for
the District ofMaryland, individually
and on behalf of Christopher, against
75 th St. Medical Center and Dr.
Yarborough. The jury acquitted Dr.
Yarborough, but found that 75 th St.
Medical did not meet the requisite
standard of care in treating Christopher, and that this deviation
proximately caused Christopher's
injury. The jury further determined
that Christopher's parents discovered the injury to Christopher in
November 1993, but Christopher
did not discover the injury until
1999.
Following the jury's verdict, the
district court ruled the action barred
by the statute oflimitations pursuant
to Section 5-109 ofthe Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article. The
court determined that the statute of
limitations commenced running in
November 1993 when Christopher's parents learned ofthe injury,
and entered judgment for 75 th St.
Medical Center on that basis. The
Piselli's appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which certified the
following question to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland: "[W]hether,

when a claim is brought by parents
on behalf ofa child who was injured
before reaching age eleven, the
three-year statute oflimitations of
Section 5-109(a)(2) begins to
accrue upon the discovery of the
injury by the child or upon
discovery of the injury by the
parents." Id. at 193, 808 A.2d at
510-11.
The court of appeals recognized this as an issue of first
impression in the State, the
resolution of which was dispositive
of the case. Id. at 197-98, 808
A.2d at 513. The action was filed
within three years of the date
Christopher discovered the injury,
but more than three years after his
parents' discovery. Id. Therefore,
if the statute of limitations
commenced from the time of
Christopher's discovery of the
injury, the jury's verdict would
stand with regard to Christopher's
claim, but if it began accruing from
the time ofthe parent's discovery,
the action was barred. Piselli, 371
Md. at 197-98, 808 A.2d at
513(2002)).
The court reformulated the
question certified by the U.S. court
of appeals to consider whether the
limitations periods prescribed by
Section 5-109 for the claim of a
minor are ''unreasonable restrictions
upon a traditional remedy and the
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minor's access to the courts and,
therefore, are in violation ofArticle
19 [of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights]." Id. at 207, 808 A.2d at
519. Article 19 prohibits unreasonable restrictions of remedies that
are traditionally available to
plaintiffs, and restrictions that limit
a plaintiff's access to the courts. Id.
at 207, 808 A.2d at 518.
In light of the reformulated
question, the court looked to
relevant case law. In Garay v.
Overholtzer, the court recognized
that a parent's cause of action and
a claim brought on behalf of a child
are distinct and separate. Id. at
209, 808A.2d at 520 (citing Garay
v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 631
A.2d 429 (1993)). In Johns
Hopkins Hasp. v. Pepper, the court
applied its decision in Garay to a
medical malpractice claim brought
on behalf of an infant child, holding
that the doctrine of necessaries
protects a minor's right to recover
medical expenses that his parents
cannot afford to pay and for which
the child may ultimately be liable. Id
at 210-11,808 A.2d at 522 (citing
Johns Hopkins Hasp., 346 Md.
679,697 A.2d 1358 (1997)). The
court further noted the wellestablished principle in the State of
Maryland that the statute of
limitations typically does not begin
running against a child until the child
reaches the age ofmajority. Id. at
212, 808 A.2d at 522.
In consideration of these
factors, the court determined that
permitting the limitations period
prescribed by Section 5-109 to
begin accruing from the time of a
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minor's injury would place "an
unreasonable restriction upon a
child's remedy and the child's
access to the courts" pursuant to
Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. Piselli, 371
Md. at 215, 808 A.2d at 524
(2002). If allowed, the child's
separate cause of action would be
dependent upon his parents filing an
action in a timely manner. Id. As a
child is not able to bring a tort action
on his own behalf until reaching the
age of eighteen, the limitations
period for the child's claim should
not begin running until the child
reaches that age. Id. at 215-16,
808 A.2d at 524.
The court of appeals held that
the statue oflimitations for a child's
medical malpractice claim, as
prescribed by Section 5-109 ofthe
Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, begins running when the
child reaches the age of majority. In
so holding, the court opens a door
previously closed to children injured
as minors whose claims were not
filed in a timely manner by their
parents.
In a climate already strained
by the constantly rising costs of
medical malpractice premiums, due
in large part to exorbitant jury
awards, this decision is likely to
exacerbate the problem by
dramatically increasing the number
of potential plaintiffs. This decision
reflects the court's conviction that
the rights of children must be
protected and should not be limited
by the vigilance of their parents.
Accordingly, a child's right to bring
suit for tortious injuries suffered

during childhood is, in this decision,
extended to an age in which the child
is capable ofmaking decisions in his
own best interest.
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